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The Added Value of the Criminology 
of Place to the Research Agenda of  
Environmental Criminology: The Necessity 
of Mechanism-Based Frameworks
Gerben J.N. Bruinsma and Lieven J.R. Pauwels
Introduction
The criminology of place is a recent development in geographical crimi-
nology that draws on a rich tradition of two hundred years of spatial research 
on crime rates (Bruinsma 2017). The focus of study has been centered on 
the spatial distribution of crime and its variations at several levels of aggre-
gation like countries, provinces, cities or neighborhoods. During these two 
centuries the unit of analysis of geographical criminology gradually shifted 
from countries and regions to micro places today (Weisburd, Bruinsma, and 
Bernasco 2009). Micro places can be street segments, shops, restaurants, 
railway stations or shopping malls. Since 1980 a growing number of empiri-
cal research efforts have demonstrated that crimes cluster at micro places 
(Telep and Weisburd 2017; Weisburd 2015; Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012; 
Weisburd and Telep 2014). A small number of crime places are accountable 
for the majority of crime counts of larger areas. This clustering of crime at 
places seems to be a universal empirical ‘fact’. That is why Weisburd pro-
claimed the ‘law of crime concentration’ stating that ‘for a defined measure 
of crime at a specific micro geographic unit, the concentration of crime will 
fall within a narrow bandwidth of percentages for a defined cumulative pro-
portion of crime’ (Weisburd 2015: 138). However, the theoretical develop-
ment of the criminology of crime places is still in its early stages. The next 
step in the criminology of place is to address the issue of explaining why 
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there is a clustering of crime at micro places. To achieve this goal one can 
rely on existing spatial theories like (various versions of) social disorganiza-
tion theory or opportunity theory (see chapter 3 of Weisburd et al. 2016), or 
one can make use of promising insights from other disciplines such as (the 
psychology of) geography or sociology.
This chapter aims at contributing to theorizing on crime place by introduc-
ing fundamental ideas from philosophers of science and methodologists to the 
criminology of place that can be very fruitful to the understanding of why 
crimes cluster. These innovative ideas are centered on the concepts of ‘causal 
mechanisms’ and ‘emergence’. We submit that these concepts are very useful 
to understand and to explain why crimes are concentrated at micro places. 
These ideas are borrowed from well-known philosophers like Bunge (2004); 
Hedström (2005); Elster (2007); Manzo (2010); Coleman (1990); Wan (2011); 
and Thagard (1998). They have in common their focus on the complex notion 
of causality, a highly debated concept in the philosophy of science and a long 
avoided topic in criminology in which a majority of the theoretical thinking is 
limited to correlational relationships (Wikström 2007). In the next section, we 
first discuss key questions and a selection of core propositions of the criminol-
ogy of place (formulated as ‘if, then’ sentences). Many of these statements 
originated from US research, however, claiming universal validity. We will 
discuss the status of general propositions in the third section, demonstrating 
that the traditional deductive-nomological method (DN-model) of covering 
law-like (universal) explanations (Hempel 1965; Hempel and Oppenheim 
1948; Popper 1975) in its original application led to confusion. A lot of schol-
ars became dissatisfied with this model and were convinced that such explana-
tions would not lead to scientific progress in our discipline. Nowadays many 
philosophers of science (Hedström 2005) are dissatisfied with the DN-model 
and have offered a powerful alternative causal explanation. This alternative is 
strongly based on the complex concepts of causal mechanisms and emergence, 
the central topics of this section. We then continue the discussion of examples 
of core propositions in the criminology of place that are based on mechanisms. 
We try to show how these mechanisms can be linked to crime generators and 
crime attractors of micro places. We conclude that the explanation of the clus-
tering of crimes cannot be done properly without the presence of individual 
agents who are triggered to make action decisions at these settings. Places are 
merely passive entities, not active agents. They cannot commit crimes; only 
human actors can do so. But places may have detrimental causal effects on 
some individuals under some circumstances. For the sake of convenience we 
limit ourselves in this chapter to public crimes. However, it should be clear 
that the ideas presented here can be transposed to other micro places and crime 
types.
The chapter will be closed by a discussion of what the advantages and dis-
advantages are when working with core propositions to explain why crimes 
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cluster at micro places that are based on the elaboration of causal mechanisms 
and emergence.
Key Questions and Core Propositions of Criminology  
of Crime and Place
The criminology of places is grounded on two hundred years of spatial 
research at various levels of aggregation (Bruinsma 2017; Bruinsma and 
Weisburd 2014a, 2014b). In the beginning in the 1830s, French, Belgian and 
English mathematicians and cartographers started to study empirically the 
distribution of crime across countries and counties (Greg 1835; Guerry 1832, 
1833; Quételet 1847, 1848, 1984[1831]; Rawson 1839). By using officially 
recorded crime data, these scholars in general revealed unequal spatial distri-
butions of crime across countries and large areas. Guerry (1833), for instance, 
found more violent crimes in the southern part of France and more property 
crimes in the northern provinces of France (and displayed these findings on 
maps). The 1920s marked a second period of heydays in spatial criminology. 
US sociologists and criminologists (ignoring the European geographic litera-
ture of the 19th century) studied the impact of neighborhood characteristics of 
big cities on crime rates (with Chicago as the most researched city) (Burgess 
1967 [1925]; Park and Burgess 1967 [1925]; Shaw and McKay 1969 [1942]; 
Shaw, Zorbaugh, McKay, and Cottrell 1929). Leading theory in those days was 
the social disorganization theory as developed by Thomas (1966) and Shaw 
and McKay (1969 [1942]).
After a period of criticism (Kornhauser 1978; Robinson 1950) that led to a 
decline in spatial research in our discipline, a new period of spatial criminology 
emerged in the 1980s in which Paul and Patricia Brantingham in Canada and 
Ralph Taylor in Philadelphia called attention to micro places in criminology 
(Brantingham and Brantingham 1978, 1981; Taylor 1987, 1988; Taylor, Gott-
fredson, and Brower 1981, 1985). The Brantinghams introduced the notion 
of the geometry of crime and elaborated a crime site selection model that can 
be seen as a predecessor of their crime pattern theory. They sought to explain 
how targets come to the attention of individual offenders, how that influences 
where they offend and how the collective activity patterns of offenders affect 
the distribution of crime events over time and across places. Taylor focused on 
the micro level physical environment (micro-ecology) and its influence on an 
individual’s behavior.
This development affected an entire new generation of scholars who 
started to readdress the study of crime in neighborhoods (Reiss and Tonry 
1986). Especially the question of whether communities have crime careers 
(Reiss 1986) was vividly discussed. Bursik revisited crime rates in Chicago 
neighborhoods over long time periods and found that stability or instabil-
ity in the social characteristics of neighborhoods would lead to stability or 
instability in crime rates (Bursik 1984, 1986; Bursik and Grasmick 1993). 
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Later, Sampson developed the collective efficacy theory, in which he unrav-
eled why poverty and residential mobility are positively related to crime 
and victimization rates (Sampson 2010, 2012). His theory stressed the 
importance of a community that is characterized by social trust and the will-
ingness to intervene on commonly identified problems, such as crime and 
safety concerns.
At the time when computerized crime mapping and more sophisticated 
geographical statistical tools were about to emerge, a new group of theorists 
challenged traditional criminological (ecological) interest. Cohen and Felson 
put forward their routine activity theory, arguing that variations in crime rates 
were caused by the routine nature of targets and guardianship, irrespective 
of criminal motives of offenders (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson 2008). The 
Canadians Patricia and Paul Brantingham developed their crime pattern the-
ory focusing on places by asking why and how targets came to the attention 
of offenders and how that influenced the distribution of crime over time and 
across places (Brantingham and Brantingham 1984, 2008, 1981). When an 
offender’s awareness space (cognitive map of activity nodes and paths) over-
laps with crime opportunities, crime will be more likely to occur. In 1989, 
Sherman and his colleagues Gartin and Buerger coined the term of ‘criminol-
ogy of place’ to emphasize the dawn of an exciting new era in criminology 
that focuses on micro places (previously called hot spots) (Sherman, Gartin, 
and Buerger 1989). In a study in Seattle fifteen years later, Weisburd and his 
colleagues reported that between 4% and 5% of street segments in the city 
accounted for 50% of the crimes for each year over fourteen years (Weisburd, 
Bushway, Lum, and Yang 2004). Since then, a great number of empirical stud-
ies have been carried out in various cities in search of concentrations of crime 
at small spaces, followed by a substantial number of publications to answer the 
question of why studying crime clusters at micro places is important for crimi-
nology (Groff, Weisburd, and Yang 2010; Weisburd 2015; Weisburd, Bernasco, 
and Bruinsma 2009; Weisburd et al. 2016; Weisburd et al. 2012; Weisburd 
and Telep 2014). These and other empirical results (Bernasco and Steenbeek 
2016; Steenbeek and Weisburd 2016) allow Weisburd to conclude that there 
is a ‘law of crime concentration’ in criminology: ‘for a defined measure of 
crime at a specific micro geographic unit, the concentration of crime will fall 
within a narrow bandwidth of percentages for a defined cumulative proportion 
of crime’ (Weisburd 2015: 138). Studying micro places is important because 
larger areas can hide large underlying variations in crime (Glyde 1856), or can 
hide underlying differences in social worlds of residents or passers-by (Zor-
baugh 1929); individuals have a limited space-awareness (Brantingham and 
Brantingham 1984, 2008); offenders commit their crimes at specific locations, 
not in large areas (Bernasco 2010a, 2010b); and specific features of locations 
influence the choices of offenders (Johnson 2014; Townsley et al. 2015; Wik-
ström 2014).
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What are the key questions of the criminology of places? According to 
Weisburd (Weisburd 2015; Weisburd et al. 2016; Weisburd et al. 2012) the key 
questions of criminology of places are:
1. Is the law of crime concentrations at places valid?
2. Is the law of crime concentrations at places valid across time?
3. Is the law of crime concentrations at places valid across cities?
4. Why is crime clustered at places?
5. Do crime opportunities, victimization and guardianship at places vary in 
significant ways across a city?
6. Do variations of crime opportunities, victimization and guardianship at 
places vary in significant ways across time or are they stable?
7. Are characteristics of crime places correlated with social disorganization?
To classify the key questions, one could argue that most of them are empirical 
questions in the Humean sense: they are questions on the existence of con-
stant conjunctions in reality (1, 2, 3, 5 and 6). To answer these key questions, 
further empirical research needs to be carried out (next to the already existing 
empirical evidence). Questions 6 and 7 however also suggest that opportuni-
ties, victimization and guardianship are relevant (causal) factors when studying 
crime concentrations at micro places. Nevertheless, they are also empirical 
issues to be solved in the future. Question 7 is more ambiguously formulated: 
it is an empirical question to be answered, but suggests also some theoretical 
significance. The question implies what Wikström has called ‘the causes of 
the causes’ research. It is not directed to explain why crimes cluster at micro 
places. The theory of social disorganization might be an interesting theory to 
explain these features of micro places. However, there is no argument offered 
as to why social disorganization theory is presumed the most promising spatial 
theory. Considering the numerous versions of social disorganization theory that 
have flourished in the criminological literature, the reader has to make a guess 
about which version is the most promising.
More interesting for our contribution is question 4 in which the open why-
question is raised: the search for causal explanations of crime concentration 
at places (Bruinsma 2010; Opp 2002; Taylor 2015; Ultee 1977). We focus on 
that key question, while stressing that much research has already been carried 
out to establish empirically concentrations in crime at micro places (similar to 
other levels of aggregation during the last two centuries). Recent studies have 
demonstrated without any doubt an empirical regularity of the clustering of 
crimes justifying criminologists—by using the principle of induction—to pro-
claim the universality of this given in a law of crime concentration (Weisburd 
2015: 139).
This law of crime concentration as formulated by Weisburd can be clas-
sified as an empirical law, not a causal law. If it was a causal law, the law 
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should have been worded like ‘if X, then Y’ (a concentration of crimes at micro 
places), in which X is the explanans and Y is the explanandum and micro place 
the unit of analysis (to which the statement would apply). That is not the case 
here. To answer the why-question we cannot fall back on this law. We have 
to explore the existing theoretical literature to search for core propositions. 
Spatial criminology has been productive the last forty years and produced 
about forty different theories on crime concentrations (see for a list Bruinsma 
2010). Obviously, they cannot all be true at the same time (Bruinsma 2016). 
The current state of spatial criminology however does not allow for distinction 
between the theories based on true and false explanations, neither by conclu-
sive empirical findings nor by assessing them with methodological standards. 
There is more or less a situation of what Lakatos called pseudo-pluralism not 
pluralism (Lakatos 1970). To give an example: spatial theories have different 
units of analysis, reflecting historical developments of research traditions in 
criminology (Weisburd, Bruinsma, et al. 2009) and use concepts that resemble 
each other and in many cases overlap (Bruinsma 2013). To discuss them all 
goes beyond the scope of this contribution. Therefore, we limit ourselves to 
the most popular and inspiring spatial theory nowadays: the routine activity 
theory (RAT) developed by Cohen and Felson (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson 
2008; Felson and Cohen 1980). Felson (2008) later called it an approach, not 
a theory, but we better ignore his judgment for this moment. RAT had origi-
nally a macro scope version to explain temporal variations in crime rates in 
one country (US) by using characteristics like the level of technology or the 
social organization of households. We put that macro version aside because it 
is unsuitable to explain concentrations of crime at micro places. In the micro 
version of RAT, the most popular version in spatial criminology, daily routines 
of people play an essential role: “These routines deliver temptations and con-
trols and thus organize the type and amount of crime in society” (Felson 1994: 
42). Three factors play a role in influencing why crimes happen at a location: 
(1) motivated offenders must be present; (2) suitable targets must be available; 
and (3) capable guardians must not be present. Physical characteristics of the 
location are not mentioned in RAT (unless physical characteristics are part of 
the suitable targets). Nevertheless, they are important: you can only shoplift 
in a store.
We can formulate RAT as follows:
If and only if the following factors are all valid at the same time at a 
location:
Motivated offenders are present;
Suitable targets are available; and
Capable guardians are not present,
Then a crime is likely to happen at that location.
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The issue here is that the dependent variable of this theory is not a concen-
tration of crimes at micro places. Assuming that a location can be subsumed 
under micro places, we can solve a first problem by stating that RAT has a 
similar unit of analysis as the law of crime concentration at micro places. Next, 
we have to decide whether the explanans ‘crimes happen at location’ is similar 
to concentrations of crime. Literally that is not the case. RAT is only stating 
that crimes will occur when the elements of the crime triangle are combined. 
There are no indications that locations with motivated offenders, attractive 
targets and no capable guardians have disproportionally more crimes than 
other locations.1 We have to reformulate RAT to make it suitable to explain 
concentrations of crimes. With the contemporary state-of-the art knowledge 
that is not possible. The theory is not clear enough about how many numbers 
of attractive targets, motivated offenders or guardians, the kind of attractive-
ness of targets or the kind of motivated offenders are needed to be a meaning-
ful tipping point to affect crime concentrations. Furthermore, it is likely that 
variations in guardianship might be more relevant than just the absence of it 
(Reynald 2009; 2011).
Given this example, it would be advisable to find out if and, if yes, how 
other disciplines such as philosophy of science, methodology and sociology 
might be helpful to improve our theory of explaining spatial concentrations of 
crimes at micro places.
Unraveling Mechanisms to Provide Causal Explanations  
in the Crime Place Theories
Before delving into the problem of mechanisms and the necessity of mech-
anism-based explanations in crime place theories and research, we point to 
the fact that in criminology a lot of misunderstandings exist regarding the 
complex notion of causation (Sampson, Winship, and Knight 2013). To fully 
understand the complex notion of causation, scholars can learn a lot by study-
ing the philosophy of causation (for an overview, see Beebee, Hitchcock, and 
Menzies 2009). No single theory of causation has been discovered that is free 
of counter-examples. This says a lot about the complexity of the concept. Phi-
losophers have understood for ages the complexities surrounding the notion of 
causation. In the past century, many efforts have been undertaken to get a grip 
on that vague, dubious but nevertheless very important concept. While social 
scientists in general—and crime place theorists are probably no exception to 
the rule—take different stances toward the notion of causation, it may be good 
to give a broad overview of influential notions of causations that have fos-
tered inquiries into the causes of criminality, acts of crime or criminal events, 
depending on the dependent variable that is of interest.
While the famous philosopher of science Bertrand Russell (2013) declared 
the concept of causation dead and denounced it as a relic of a bygone age, 
we shall argue that a thorough understanding of causation is pivotal for the 
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development of explanations of crime concentrations. The concept of causation 
was strongly criticized by David Hume, who argued that causation, no matter 
how important, faced an ultimate problem: it could never be observed, and 
even the most stable regular observation could not guarantee that the observa-
tion could be repeated, let alone that it could be understood causally (Morris 
and Brown 2016). We should be clear on one thing: Hume was not against cau-
sation; quite on the contrary, he strongly believed the world was full of causal 
events, only the causal process itself could never be demonstrated (Tacq 1984). 
For Hume, collapsing billiard balls were highly suggestive of causal forces 
being at work, but these ‘dark’ forces are not observable. Therefore, Hume 
developed a regularity view of causation. In that view, causation is restricted to 
constant conjunction, nothing more and nothing less (correlations are all that 
matter; all the rest is chatter). It may be clear that many scholars did not agree. 
Although all philosophers of causation clearly understood that Hume hit the 
bull’s eye by unraveling a key problem, many felt that there was a shortcoming 
in the Humean notion of causation. Applying the Hume problem to the study 
of crime concentrations at micro places makes clear that criminologists are not 
learning much more than the fact that factors by varying degrees of necessity 
or sufficiency are regularly observed together.
The influence of Hume’s view cannot be neglected. The concept of constant 
conjunction (i.e. the regularity definition) ultimately gave rise to the idea of a 
tradition that aimed at detecting such regularities, which was at the time called 
the DN-model, i.e. the deductive-nomological model of explanation (Hempel 
1965). The DN-model was based on the idea that science grows by finding 
law-like explanations and that the role of the scientist is to observe regularities 
(e.g. settings that have a high level of physical disorder and dilapidation also 
are settings where many drugs are sold).
According to this explanatory model, the deductive-nomological model, as 
developed by Hempel and Oppenheim, the researcher was supposed to observe 
the initial condition, which was stated as follows (Hempel and Oppenheim 
1948):
Law 1: The higher the level of physical disorder at specific micro places 
in comparison to other micro places in a city, the higher the attraction 
of those micro places for drug dealers in comparison to other places in 
that city.
Law 2: The higher the number of drug dealers at micro places in compari-
son to other micro places in a city, the higher the number of customers 
at those micro places in comparison to other micro places in that city 
and the higher number of ‘economic transactions’.
Initial condition: At places with higher levels of physical disorder also 
high numbers of drug deals are being observed compared to the case at 
other micro places with low physical disorder.
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Explanandum: The high number of drug deals can be explained by the 
attraction of places with high levels of physical disorder for drug dealers.
The DN-model resulted in so-called covering laws. Although these covering 
laws were sometimes highly informative (Opp 2002), the DN-model has since 
been discarded as it was not waterproof. According to opponents, the major 
problem with the DN-model (there are many problems, but for the sake of con-
ceptual parsimony we only refer to some) is that the formulation of explanations 
in terms of initial conditions, an explanans and a law does not guarantee that 
causes are identified.
The DN-model was thus restricted to observation that indeed could be regu-
larly conducted. But a regularity view does not necessitate causation. Another 
issue at stake is the determinist view of the DN-model. The model was origi-
nally and preferably stated in if and only if terms, leaving no room for error. 
While the latter issue could easily be solved by a variant of the DN-model, the 
inductive statistical (IS) model, the problems here become even more clear: 
the IS model is not based on deductive reasoning but merely on statistical 
laws, which have inductive character, thus weakening the assumptions of the 
DN-model.
Many philosophers of causation were dissatisfied with the DN-model, and 
while the model was predominant in social sciences, at least during the time 
when Popper’s critical rationalism was a major paradigm (Popper 1974, 1975), 
it has been largely abandoned. An increasing number of both philosophers and 
social scientists started to discuss the notion of causation and increasingly 
acknowledged that the DN-model fell short. One philosopher of science, Mario 
Bunge, has strongly criticized the DN-model and offered a powerful alterna-
tive definition of causation (Bunge 1979). Causation, he argued, is about rela-
tions between events. An event is an object that can change from one state to 
another. Events can take place in micro places: an object in a micro place can 
be victimized or not. From this, it follows that only changes can be considered 
as causes. Bunge further stressed (1) the notion of production (an effect needs 
to be brought about by a mechanism) and (2) the notion of law-likeness (each 
unique causal connection should be observed at a regular basis, i.e. it is impos-
sible to observe a causal relationship only once).2 Bunge (1979) originally bor-
rowed examples from regular and quantum physics, and distinguished between 
causation (causal determination) and auto-determination (‘spontaneity’), which 
he considered a random term (which we argue is highly comparable to what 
Sampson and Laub referred to as random ‘developmental noise’). Of major 
interest for the criminology of micro places is the way Bunge (1999) reflected 
on causation for the social sciences in his Finding Philosophy in Social Sci-
ences. He stressed that the world is multicausal and full of causal interaction, 
and argued that social scientists should pay attention to causes (‘external 
events’) in two forms: energy transfers (e.g. the observation of disorder at a 
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micro place causes the actor to decide whether to commit a crime at the micro 
place; brain processes are examples of energy transfers) and triggering events 
(e.g. one actor convinces another actor to commit a crime at a micro place). 
Causes (system-extern events) can thus have proportional or chaos-like effects 
(small causes, huge consequences, like when a terrorist selects a micro place). 
Bunge realized that even when causal production would lie behind observed 
correlations, studies of causal relations would ultimately be restricted to the 
detection of probabilistic relations, because he recognized how improbable it 
would be to detect all the relevant mechanisms, and acknowledged that in the 
situations where events are caused by more than one factor, all relations were 
bound to result in probabilistic equations. He stressed that causation (under 
the right circumstances) would lead to production of an outcome via one or 
more mechanisms. In later works, philosophers of science stressed the notion 
of conditionality (i.e. searching for the right conditions under which produc-
tive, law-like events could be brought about by some mechanism).
In short, many philosophers of causation who did not agree with the 
Humean notion of causation felt that law-like explanations were too dangerous 
(restricted for social science), and these philosophers provided strong alterna-
tive perspectives on causation. While it is impossible to discuss them all, it 
is essential to stress the consequences of these philosophical works for the 
criminology of crime places and the study of our understanding of the law of 
crime concentration. Clearly, the law of crime concentration cannot be under-
stood as a mere statistical probability affecting law, because it does not teach 
us anything with regard to the multiple mechanisms (at multiple levels) that 
are involved, let alone what kinds of mechanisms: social mechanisms, devel-
opmental mechanisms or situational mechanisms.
However, we believe that for a thorough understanding the law of crime 
concentration requires that we must be aware of the nature of the causal events. 
We submit the thesis that event causation (the type of causation philosophers 
usually talk about) is not very fruitful in criminology. Event causation is com-
monly studied in (quantum) physics, biology, etc., but in social science, acts 
of crimes (events) are always caused by actors. While causal processes take 
place in humans (changes in brain states and changes in decision-making), 
event causation does not stress the actor and suggests that all humans passively 
undergo the causal cement of the universe. The necessity of recognizing the 
actor as an active person, able to bring about events, has already been stressed 
by George Henrik von Wright in the 1970s (Von Wright 2004), but only a 
very few scholars in criminology picked up the notion of ‘action’ (i.e. acts 
in deliberate or spontaneous mode), while its consequences were huge. Von 
Wright provided scholars with a revolutionary idea at that time. He argued that 
it was by doing things that humans brought about events, and thus, he intro-
duced actor-causation in several sciences. Von Wright was responsible for (re)
introducing notions of ‘agency’ in causal theories in social sciences, thereby 
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also influencing a lot of ‘rational choice thinking’ (in both narrow and wide 
versions, and even influencing reasonable actor thinking, which is paramount 
to the analytical tradition in sociology).
What is the major consequence of recognizing actor causation for the crimi-
nology of crime places? It is clear that not every property that is related to the 
commission of a criminal act (e.g. at the micro place level) can be an external 
causal event or internal mechanism. Not all properties of micro places can be 
interpreted as having a strong causal effect for several reasons: micro places are 
not actors; they are small areas whose effect depends on the perception of oppor-
tunities (e.g. temptation, provocation) of the setting to commit an act, deliber-
ately or habitually.3 This notion of dual processes is increasingly being applied in 
crime causation theories, e.g. situational action theory (Wikström 2014) and the 
model of frame selection (Kroneberg, Heintze, and Mehlkop 2010).
Action causation refers to the commitment of an act as a consequence of an 
individual deliberating on the act or as a consequence of triggering and habit-
ual response. This distinction is necessary when we try to understand what is 
going on. When we want to know why some places are crime ridden, we must 
understand the consequences of our choices: when we restrict ourselves to the 
study of the criminal event, we risk ignoring that a criminal event at a micro 
place is the result of humans that perceive action alternatives and make deci-
sions in an environment (of micro place).
The productivity element in causation made some philosophers of science 
think about how production could be translated and tested, and this discussion 
led to the idea of interventionism. A key supporter of the interventionist causal-
ity notion is James Woodward (Woodward 2003). He argues his vision in his 
book Making Things Happen:
I favour a broad notion of causation according to which, roughly, any explanation 
which proceeds by showing how an outcome depends (where the dependence in 
question is not logical or conceptual) on other variables or factors counts as causal. 
I suggest that the distinguishing feature of causal explanations, so conceived, is that 
they are explanations that furnish information that is potentially relevant to manipu-
lation and control; they tell us how, if we were able to change the value of one or 
more variables, we could change the value of other variables (Woodward 2003: 6).
He continued:
My idea is that one ought to be able to associate with any successful explanation a 
hypothetical or counterfactual experiment that shows us that and how manipulation 
of the factors mentioned in the explanation (the explanans, as philosophers would 
call it) would be a way of manipulating or altering the phenomenon explained (the 
explanandum) . . . [A]n explanation ought to be such that it can be used to answer 
what I call a what-if-things-had-been-different question (Woodward 2003: 11).
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Now that we have explained, albeit in a nutshell and being somewhat selec-
tive, the elements of causation that are quintessential to crime place theories, 
the notion of causation and the fact that studying laws may not be enough, we 
need to delve further into the notion of mechanisms. A crucial element is the 
presence of a mechanism or a series of mechanisms that bring about the event 
(or the act of crime). The attention to mechanisms is not new in social sciences, 
but was latently embedded in the theories of the founders of sociology such 
as Durkheim and Merton. Therefore, we can still learn important lessons from 
these founding fathers today, which, as the sociologist Peter Hedström (2005) 
stated, go further than mere historical lessons. Although these founders were 
not always theoretically sophisticated, and they did not have the most sophisti-
cated analytical techniques available, their merit lies exactly in their approach 
to and their vision of science. Merton’s research program concerned the devel-
opment and testing of theories of the medium-range scope. Merton (1996) saw 
analysis in terms of mechanisms as a good compromise between the unattain-
able (Hempelian) covering laws, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the 
non-explanatory descriptions that many theoretical and empirical analyses have 
restricted themselves to. In his view, the main task of the sociologist is to iden-
tify social mechanisms and to determine under what conditions they arise and 
fail (Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 6). Merton (1968: 43) wrote about social 
mechanisms as fundaments of sociological middle-range theories and defined 
the word ‘mechanism’ as ‘social processes having designated consequences for 
designated parts of the social structure’. In contemporary sociology the concept 
of ‘social mechanism’ is prominent in the writings of Mario Bunge (2003), 
James Coleman (1986) and Peter Hedström (2005). A mechanism is internal 
to a system; it explains how something works, and can therefore contribute to 
increasing insights into the relationship between micro places and crime.
A major shortcoming of covering law-based theorizing is that it excludes 
from the explanation exactly these processes that make it possible to really 
understand why social entities, such as micro places, exhibit the regularities 
they do. The problem is basically that referring to a state of affairs is not enough 
to provide a causal explanation. In this respect, covering law theories are black-
box explanations that exclude from focus those processes that would allow us to 
understand why a specific causal factor is likely to be of explanatory relevance.
This problem has plagued the ecological school for too long: what was lack-
ing in the ecological approach of Shaw and McKay, but also of Blau and Blau 
(1982) and Stark (1987), other early scholars of crime place theories, and also 
of those who considered themselves to be methodological ‘holists’, was their 
failure to theorize and empirically demonstrate the basic entities and activities 
that generate these correlations. The most reasonable ontological hypothesis 
we can formulate in order to make sense of the social world as we know it 
is that it is individuals in interaction with others in settings that generate the 
social regularities we observe.
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In many disciplines great efforts are made to understand what a cause would 
produce were it to act alone, with no other causes at work. For example, in 
econometrics parameters are estimated that represent what a single cause by 
itself contributes to an overall effect (see Cartwright 2007); the same happens 
in quantitative criminology. Philosophers of science, especially those who 
work from the ‘powerful particulars’ perspective, argue that certain character-
istics (dispositions) of objects (and actors) need to be taken into account when 
we want to understand causation (Mumford and Anjum 2011). This perspec-
tive supposes the information gained is useless since in the practical world no 
cause ever acts alone, while all causes generally act in interaction with each 
other. This is recently also acknowledged in criminology (Wikström 2007). 
Why do scholars spend great effort to learn what causal events do in circum-
stances that rarely if ever occur in isolation? Because it seems natural to expect 
that action is always the outcome of exposure to micro places and actors per-
ceiving action alternatives, defining situations and habitually or volitionally 
deciding between action alternatives, it is hard to make sense of laws (such as 
the law of crime concentration) using only the regularity law itself. The view 
of micro places as ‘passive powerful particulars’ may be of help to understand 
the law. Micro places have the ability to trigger perception-choice processes in 
some persons who are exposed to a micro place, and have the ability of being 
attractive to certain kinds of persons, i.e. selection effects (Taylor 2015). These 
abilities are attributed to specific entities in micro places. The question, from a 
micro place perspective, is what kinds of micro place characteristics have the 
ability to trigger perception-choice processes in individuals and what proper-
ties cause individuals to self-select themselves in a micro place. This example 
makes it clear how important it is not to exclude the individual from crime 
place theories. While the criminology of place raises extremely important 
questions, it is the individual who is triggered, and the individual actor alone 
has the real causal power to commit an offense. A micro place cannot produce 
or spawn crime without an actor.
Criminologists often define mechanisms as intermediate variables that are 
necessary to make an observed correlation between characteristics plausible. 
Blalock (1964) described this relationship as an indirect effect. There is however 
one danger that one should be aware of when following this interpretation. One 
cannot consider a variable that represents a mediator of another variable to be 
equal to the underlying mechanisms behind a known association, without having 
given serious thought to cause-and-effect relationships. The definition of ‘causal 
mechanism’ is usually associated with the analogy of the operation of machinery. 
Take, for example, the following definition of Paul Thagard (1998: 106–107): ‘A 
mechanism is a system of parts that operate or interact like those of a machine, 
transmitting forces, motion and energy to one another . . . Mechanical systems 
are organised hierarchically, in that mechanisms at lower levels (e.g., molecules) 
produce changes that take place at higher levels (e.g., cells)’.
15031-1206-FullBook.indb   79 9/18/2017   12:11:51 PM
80 Gerben J.N. Bruinsma and Lieven J.R. Pauwels
The Norwegian sociologist Jon Elster was one of the most important socio-
logical advocates for a renewed focus on mechanisms (Elster 1989). Elster 
wrote that the state of an event or action is tantamount for giving a plausible 
reason for why an event or action took place.
Having compared multiple mechanism definitions as developed by Bunge 
(2004); Hedström (2005); Elster (1989); and Wikström (2007) we cannot but 
conclude that no consensus exists about precise definitions of mechanisms. 
While Wikström argues that a mechanism is the process that connects a cause 
and an effect, and Elster (2007) refers to frequently occurring easily recogniz-
able patterns that are brought about under certain conditions, it is Bunge’s defi-
nition that provides the most interesting explanation of a mechanism, not only 
for the study of crime at place but for criminology as a whole. Bunge (2004) 
defines a mechanism as a process in a definite system that is able to bring about 
or to prevent an effect in that system. Bunge’s definition is important because 
of its link to systems. Micro places can be studied like systems, and in systems 
emergent processes are likely to happen. Environmental criminology is about 
spatial systems and spatial mechanisms and thus needs to study actors and 
actions at specific places that bring about their effects. Thinking of mechanisms 
in this way reveals that mechanisms are more than just intermediate variables. 
Explanation is thus not about detecting laws, while this may be a very important 
step, but should ultimately deal with an increase in our understanding of the 
mechanisms at work. By explaining things, we increase our understanding of 
the social fact. Theories of crime places should not be seen as just intellectual 
constructions useful for making predictions and controlling criminal events. If 
we translate the ideas of analytical sociologist Ylikoski (2011) to our under-
standing of the law of crime concentration, the primary epistemic goal is to 
represent the causal processes that generate the observable phenomena.
It is an important theoretical task for environmental criminology to state 
why a geographical unit of analysis plays an important theoretical role in the 
explanation of events (action). We submit that Bunge’s (1999) ideas on mech-
anism-based explanations, which he developed as an integral part of his emer-
gent systemist approach (which he often refers to as the CESM-model), can 
be a helpful tool to explain crime as individual action and crime as social fact 
(crime concentrations at places) by looking at:
1. The composition of the micro place as a system, i.e. the collection of parts 
of the system;
2. The environment of the micro place as a system or the collection of entities 
that are not a part of the system but do have an influence on parts of the 
system;
3. The structure of the micro place as a system, i.e. the whole of structural 
relationships between the parts of a system;4 and
4. The mechanisms that generate actions in a system and may stop generating 
actions in the system.
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Systemism is a way of non-reductionist theorizing that goes beyond the so-called 
methodological individualist approach (and especially the atomist approach, 
which argues that societies are only made up of individual actors, i.e. the notion 
that society is nothing more than a membership) and the holist approach, which 
overemphasizes the oversocialized conception of humans. Systemism is about 
individuals (biosocial organisms or systems) that are taking part in multiple sys-
tems. Micro places are systems, so a systemism (meta-theoretical) framework 
can be a powerful blueprint for further unraveling the generative processes 
behind the law of crime concentration. The systemic approach is so important 
because it allows for theorizing across levels, and no other framework has 
been more fruitful for the study of emergence. Some contemporary scholars, 
such as social scientists (Manzo 2010; Sawyer 2001), criminologists (Taylor 
2015; Wikström 2014) and philosophers of science (Bunge 2003; Wan 2011), 
are clearly influenced by the systemic approach (see also McGloin, Sullivan, 
and Kennedy 2012).
Toward a Better Understanding of Emergence
The idea of emergence and emergent properties is especially important if 
we want to increase our understanding of the emergence of crime places. The 
concept of emergence is often used in an inaccurate or ambiguous way to show 
something ‘new’ appearing through the interaction of different parts that the 
(complex) entity has, properties that cannot be reduced to the parts of which 
the entity consists. Emergent systemism provides an ontological definition to 
emergence.
Figure 3.1 is based on the ideas that are developed in Jepperson and Mey-
ers (2011) and can be seen as an elaboration of the famous Boudon-Coleman 
Figure 3.1 Relationships between the actor characteristics and action at multiple levels.
Individual Level
Micro Place Level
Neighborhood Level
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diagram. The only difference is that we have drawn three levels to socially give 
micro places a causal place and a context in the emergent systemic framework. 
Applying the study of emergence to the study of crime at micro places, we 
need to know what status the properties (at the individual/target level, micro 
place level and neighborhood level) have in a criminological explanation. 
What causal force can we ascribe to them, if any?
First, with regard to the debate about the (in)dependence of macro properties 
(neighborhood level) in relation to micro place level objects and individual/
target level properties: Are these neighborhoods compiled from actions of indi-
viduals? Reductionists state that the properties are not different, and they will 
derive from it that we should formulate our explanations on the micro level.
Three key problems should be addressed when we look for explanations of 
micro place concentrations: (1) is supervenience the mechanism behind micro 
place correlations, (2) to what extent is multiple realization possible and (iii) is 
there heterogeneous disjunction?
Supervenience suggests that there can be no difference in the higher 
(social) level without there being a difference in the lower (individual) 
level, which is dominated by the higher level. The dependency 
relationship (a component of non-reductionist individualism) can, 
therefore, be expressed on the basis of supervenience. For example, 
a turf war between gangs in a micro place L supervenes with regard 
to the behavior of gang members in that micro place. This means that 
the nature of the turf war R will only change if there is a change at the 
lower level, in particular, in the behavior of gang members I.
Multiple realization: an attribute on the highest level (i.e. in the present 
example a neighborhood level crime count) can be achieved in several 
different ways by attributes and objects (i.e. individuals) on the lower, 
individual level, but also in micro places at the meso-level. For exam-
ple, the number of acts of crime in a micro place can be established 
in multiple ways, i.e. different individual behavior (either a different 
number of individuals or the same returning individuals) can ensure 
that a micro place has a high level of crime counts, which in turn may 
increase the likelihood that neighborhoods have high crime rates (if 
there are no problems of overlapping boundaries). The level of crime 
counts of a micro place is not only determined by the behavior of the 
residents, but also by that of visitors, students, commuters, tourists, etc. 
Multiple realization is of major importance to evidence-based practices 
in reducing the number of crime counts in a micro place.
Heterogeneous disjunction: a characteristic on the higher level can be 
achieved by a heterogeneous-disjunctive combination of properties 
at the lower level, and, therefore, these heterogeneous-disjunctive 
combinations can be related to each other in a useful (and even lawful) 
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way. For example, if there are a high number of crime counts in a micro 
place one could suggest that these counts may not be explained by a 
law or by a rational-choice (or suboptimal choice by selection of frames 
and scripts) statement that relates to the behavior of residents, passers-
by and by-standers. The heterogeneity of the behavior of different 
individuals hinders this. As crime is generally and most often the result 
of complex interactions between the individual who perceives action 
alternatives at a setting, and chooses among alternatives through his 
or her senses, Sawyer’s argument can be used. At some micro places 
conditions can be present that interact more strongly and at shorter 
intervals with intrapersonal characteristics of people.
These three characteristics of the relationship between the higher (micro 
place) level and lower (individual) level form the arguments for the existence 
of social mechanisms (contextual effects), i.e. causation at the level of the 
micro place ecological setting. In addition, these characteristics are strong 
arguments for non-reductive individualism: supervenience clarifies the depen-
dency relationship (ontological individualism), and multiple realization and 
heterogeneous disjunction offer the arguments against a reductionist approach 
(against methodological individualism and against atomism). Sawyer (2001: 
573) refers to social causation as being supervening causation: ‘Emergentism 
does not claim that all higher-level properties are irreducible; some of them are 
predictable and derivable from the system of lower-level components. Only 
in cases where the relation between higher-level and lower-level properties 
is wildly disjunctive beyond some threshold of complexity will the higher-
level property not be lawfully reducible’ (Sawyer 2001: 558). Sawyer, just like 
Bunge, developed a powerful argument for an ontological definition of the 
concept of emergence. Ontological emergence means that new, real and non-
reducible properties (on the higher level) exist.
Disentangling the Propositions Into Mechanisms  
in Spatial Criminology
As stressed before, spatial criminology has at its disposal a great number of 
theories aiming at the explanation of the concentration of crime at spaces. Some 
have been tested in empirical studies, others are still waiting to be researched 
and others have been used to explain observed concentrations of crimes at 
micro places (Pratt and Cullen 2005; Wilcox et al. 2003). Especially (various 
versions of) social disorganization theories have been researched empirically 
for decades. Nevertheless, the theoretical development of the criminology 
of place is still in its early stages (Weisburd 2015). This kind of ecological 
research has some structural (methodological) limitations, but criminology of 
place can be helpful because of its focus on smaller units of analysis (Weis-
burd, Bernasco, et al. 2009).
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To increase our understanding of the ways micro place concentrations 
occur, we can make use of the blueprint of emergent systemism and fill out the 
blanks at multiple levels (see Figure 3.1). It is clear that we should be guided 
by theoretical integration at different levels (vertical and end-to-end integra-
tion). Drawing on the integration between environmental criminology and the 
social disorganization tradition, we can expect micro place concentrations to 
be the outcome of complex interactions between processes of informal control, 
the presence of crime attractors and generators, the moral climate of the micro 
place, the presence of gang activities (provocation), disorderly processes and 
so on. While each of these factors can be thought of to influence concentrations 
at micro places, it seems a valuable approach to search for specific combina-
tions that have the largest impact on micro place concentrations. Identifying 
the specific combinations of elements that have the largest effect on concentra-
tions may be of relevance for situational crime prevention. In Figure 3.2 an 
extended version of Figure 3.1 is presented. Each line must be elaborated to 
explain why at certain micro places concentrations of crime occur. It is a differ-
ent strategy than using e.g. social disorganization theory and opportunity the-
ory as competitors to explain the same phenomena (Braga and Clarke 2014).
Figure 3.2 is inspired by Manzo’s schematic representation of the devel-
opment of macro-micro interactions over time. As actors are responsible for 
the commission of criminal acts, we submit that micro place studies will also 
highly benefit from studies of selection processes and studies of land use. 
Understanding who makes use of the public and semi-public space at micro 
places should allow for functional differentiation of preventing activities (such 
as POP [Problem, Observation and Proposition]). Just like Sampson (2012) 
Figure 3.2 Extended relationships between actor characteristics and the actor’s envi-
ronment (elaboration of Manzo [2010]).
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and Taylor (2015) have argued in their respective work on neighborhoods and 
communities, we should treat selection (both self-selection and social selec-
tion) as a real problem and not just some problem that one needs to control for. 
Selection can turn into causation and vice-versa, in a bottom-up and top-down 
cycle of feedback loops over time. Individuals (as a result of their daily routine 
activities) ‘self-select’ habitually or deliberately places in an urban environ-
ment where they want to be; offenders may live near micro places because of 
social selection mechanisms (e.g. segregation at the housing market); potential 
offenders may create kinds of niches. Niches are places selected by (poten-
tial) offenders as bases for their criminal activities such as dealing hard drugs 
or picking pockets. As Felson (2006) argued, taking a human ecological (or 
micro-ecological; see Taylor [2015]) approach can be a valuable way of think-
ing about a micro place’s spatial mechanisms and an individual’s behavior in 
micro-ecological settings. Such an approach can add up to the mechanism-
based approach by simultaneously looking for functions.
Notwithstanding all that relevant information, it cannot be denied that loca-
tions are essentially passive agencies that can trigger perception-choice pro-
cesses of individuals. Individuals have certain characteristics that may allow 
them morally to commit criminal acts, given that the chance to be apprehended 
(by guardians or law enforcement) is as low as possible. Classic environmental 
criminology has neglected the fact that individuals can be offenders or become 
offenders when at certain locations. The past focus of environmental criminol-
ogy on large areas or neighborhoods is probably the consequence of an over-
estimation of the effect of large areas. However, individuals do not commit 
crimes in large areas or neighborhoods but at certain locations (micro places). 
The criminology of place can be the next step in explicitly elaborating the 
complex spatial mechanisms that lead to crime concentrations at micro places. 
With special empirical data, as collected by Wikström and his colleagues (Wik-
ström, Oberwittler, Treiber, and Hardie 2012) or by the NSCR in Amsterdam 
(Bernasco, Bruinsma, Pauwels, and Weerman 2013; Bernasco, Ruiter, Bruin-
sma, Pauwels, and Weerman 2013; Hoeben, Bernasco, Weerman, Pauwels, and 
van Halem 2014), these propositions can be adequately tested. These data fit 
the micro places and can be extended by systematic observations. These data 
also allow testing why certain individuals with particular characteristics may 
commit a crime at a certain setting (location) and not at another setting (Bruin-
sma, Pauwels, Weerman, and Bernasco 2015; Weerman et al. 2013).
In order to empirically test the ideas we outlined previously, we suggest the 
following strategy. First, environmental criminologists could study the empiri-
cal literature on settings/places (outside the realm of criminology). However, 
this might be a disappointing endeavor because we expect not very much lit-
erature to be found in which empirically tested causal mechanisms at places 
have been researched. Nevertheless, the existing literature may be helpful in 
tracking down interesting results or uncovering causal mechanisms that can 
AuQ02
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be used as thoughtful propositions for the next step. Second, a long-lasting 
research program can be developed to investigate step by step the presence or 
non-presence of causal mechanisms at places. We do not advocate one ‘grand 
theory’ in which all theoretical propositions can be tested empirically in one 
study, but we need informative meta-theoretical frameworks as a guide to 
research. We opt for a trial and error strategy in which step by step, during 
subsequent empirical studies, the propositions about causal mechanisms can 
be tested empirically one by one (Popper 1974). Additionally, we submit the 
thesis that it remains important to be able to compare theories, in the spirit of 
Lakatos’s research program of comparing theories. This research program (see 
Lakatos 1970; Opp 2013) should of course take into account the problems and 
prospects that have been described by proponents of the analytical school in 
sociology (Hedström 2005) and proponents of the analytical traditions in crim-
inology (Taylor 2015; Wikström et al. 2012). However, general, detailed and 
highly informative guidelines of analytical criminology as a distinct research 
paradigm are not available at the moment. The similarities are often larger 
than the differences between analytical criminology and Opp’s (2009) struc-
tural-individualist research program of comparative testing of macro-micro 
theories: the elaboration and fine-tuning of the DN-model by including gen-
erative mechanisms is difficult to distinguish in its empirical form from the 
activities of the analytical tradition (Opp 2013). Both traditions make use of 
carefully stated propositions. Often straw hypotheses lead scholars to embrace 
one research program above another. In line with Taylor (2015), we argue that 
micro place criminology may become stronger when various methods and 
data in several distinct contexts can be used and when various methodological 
issues are resolved, before hypotheses are vigorously tested. On some occa-
sions experiments can be applied; in other cases observations in combination 
with interviews or administrative data are more fruitful (with recognition of 
all the limitations administrative data have). Triangulation is of critical impor-
tance here.
A research program for micro place criminology should also design tests in 
different contexts, e.g. not only in American cities, but also in European, Afri-
can or Asian cities, to get insight into the universality of those causal mecha-
nisms at places. Whatever the focus of the studies, criminologists should not 
(exclusively) depend on existing (administrative or police) data, but should 
collect their own designed data by choosing step by step the ‘best’ (empiri-
cal) operational measures for the (theoretical) variables and phenomena under 
study. Special attention should also be paid to two topics when testing empiri-
cally causal mechanisms at places. First, researchers should develop clearly 
formulated propositions that connect places, actors and contexts as we have 
discussed. Elucidation is the goal of stating hypotheses (Bunge 1999). Exist-
ing theories can be used as a source of inspiration, but a fresh new start can 
be fruitful as well. Second, the empirical research should not only focus on 
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the attractive circumstances to commit crimes at places, but should also not 
neglect or ignore selection processes as elaborated by Taylor (2015). One 
should keep in mind in all designs that even frequent or habitual offenders 
do not commit a crime every time when being present at particular places. 
Criminologists sometimes forget that crime is still a rare phenomenon in the 
everyday life of people.
To end, we try to give a preliminary answer to the question addressed by 
Taylor (2015). Are there meta perspectives that could be used besides the 
Boudon-Coleman approach? In this chapter we have argued for a complex 
variant of the Boudon-Coleman diagram, namely Manzo’s complex structur-
alism, which is almost equivalent to Bunge’s systemism. The focus on micro 
places and the methodological and theoretical problems that are addressed in 
detail by Taylor may not lead to a reductionist approach, ignoring context and 
social selection. Adopting a full emergent systemic approach, or a complex 
structural-individualist approach, allows for a fine-tuning or fine-graining of 
the ideas that are already outlined in the classic Boudon-Coleman diagram. 
This way of thinking has been successfully applied in situational action the-
ory, where it has proven to be a productive ‘road map for building integrative 
frameworks that each explain a part of a complex interactive chain of events 
and mechanisms’, but the systemic approach of Bunge may also be useful to 
study the acts of individuals in groups (gangs) in micro places; these are dif-
ferent non-hierarchically overlapping settings that all produce individual-envi-
ronment interactions that bring about criminal events.
From the aforementioned remarks it becomes clear that micro place crim-
inology awaits a lot of challenges. The key theoretical and methodological 
questions that Ralph Taylor asks about community criminology should be 
taken into account because they are straightforwardly applicable to micro place 
criminology; the only serious difference we observe is the level of aggregation. 
Methodologically, micro place criminology awaits a lot of exciting challenges 
as the units of analyses are becoming increasingly smaller, which we suspect 
will raise concerns regarding the ecological reliability and validity of mea-
sures (Taylor 2015). Scaling issues relate to how large micro places should be, 
what are boundaries (natural or not), and can reliable and valid indicators be 
developed at such a small level? This problem is not restricted to micro place 
criminology but to criminological theorizing in general: several indicators can 
be interpreted as indicators for different concepts (collective efficacy’s dimen-
sion of informal control versus guardianship is meanwhile a known problem). 
Therefore, comparative testing of competing integrative models using mul-
tiple valid indicators is a daunting task for micro place criminology. Finally, 
and often neglected, although it has been stressed elsewhere (Taylor 2015; 
Wikström and Sampson 2003), the study of both self-selection and social pro-
cesses as separate non-causal processes that bear causal consequences, which 
in turn can affect the perception of action alternatives or the choices that actors 
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make deliberately or habitually in micro places, should be part of an emergent 
research program that may advance our current knowledge on micro places as 
systems in criminology.
Conclusion
The goal of the present chapter is to stimulate theorizing on spatial mecha-
nisms to increase our understanding of crime concentrations at micro places. 
The study of crime at multiple levels of analysis requires a mechanism-based 
approach. Social and micro-ecological processes that connect causes and 
effects at different levels of analysis are being studied within this approach. 
These levels should be explicated, and the theoretically relevant mechanisms 
that operate at each level should be clearly dissected and defined. The answer 
to these ‘why’ questions can best be given when four principles are taken into 
account: the principles of explanation, dissection, precision and clarity, and 
action. These principles force environmental criminologists to study crime as a 
social phenomenon at small levels of aggregation (micro-ecology) and give an 
explanation that goes beyond the relations between variables. We should keep 
in mind also that, when it comes to crime prevention at the micro place level, 
causality does not operate at the variable level. Micro places are not active 
causal agents, but that does not mean that they have no causal effect. They 
can bring about judgments and (consciously or unconsciously) trigger action 
strategies in individuals in micro places as action is always a consequence of 
perceiving an action alternative and choosing an act of crime as a viable action 
alternative. Advanced theoretical development in environmental criminology 
is necessary if we want to improve our insight into the complexity of a spatially 
skewed phenomenon such as crime, and if we want to develop better (i.e. more 
successful, evidence-based) prevention projects that achieve crime reduction 
at the micro place levels.
One strong point of this approach is that it appeals for the study of crime as 
action at multiple levels of analysis from a theoretical point of view. To illus-
trate the existence of crime at multiple levels, Boudon-Coleman’s approach 
toward the study of macro-micro relations was given as an example. Bunge’s 
CESM-model can help to determine the nature of observed correlations at mul-
tiple levels. This framework can easily be extended to the study of other topics 
in environmental criminology while still using the same principles of analyti-
cal precision.
Notes
1. In practice, many criminologists or crime analysts studying the spatial distribution 
of crimes first observe a number of locations with high crime counts, and afterward 
assume that those locations ‘thus’ must have attractive targets, motivated offenders 
and no guardians. This practice is called ad-hoc explanation, but has no empirical 
or theoretical validity. Despite its popularity and simplicity, the empirical status of 
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RAT is anyway not very impressive (Mustaine and Tewksbury 1997; Pratt and Cullen 
2005; Wilcox, Land and Hunt 2003). In most research, RAT is not empirically tested 
by measuring the propositions of the theory as well as the concepts that figure in it.
2. Bunge (1979) recognized that causation is a complex notion and was one of the first 
to argue that a causal explanation needs to be mechanism-based. Bunge has previ-
ously been accused of being deterministic, but that is a consequence of wrong read-
ing of the first edition of his opus magnum on causation. Scholars originally tended 
to equate causation with causal determinism, but causal determination simply means 
that something is determined by something else. Determination is thus not determin-
ism (the idea that everything is caused by something else—causalism), and even 
determinism is not the same as fatalism. These conceptual misunderstandings are 
truly a consequence of a lack of insight in the philosophical literature on causation.
3. See system 1 versus system 2 thinking by Kahneman (2011).
4. Structure should not be confused with the composition of the system. Structure 
refers to the relations between actors in a system.
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